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Abstract
Containing an epidemic at its origin is the most desirable mitigation. Epidemics have often originated in rural areas,
with rural communities among the first affected. Disease dynamics in rural regions have received limited attention,
and results of general studies cannot be directly applied since population densities and human mobility factors are
very different in rural regions from those in cities. We create a network model of a rural community in Kansas,
USA, by collecting data on the contact patterns and computing rates of contact among a sampled population. We
model the impact of different mitigation strategies detecting closely connected groups of people and frequently
visited locations. Within those groups and locations, we compare the effectiveness of random and targeted
vaccinations using a Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered compartmental model on the contact network. Our
simulations show that the targeted vaccinations of only 10% of the sampled population reduced the size of the
epidemic by 34.5%. Additionally, if 10% of the population visiting one of the most popular locations is randomly
vaccinated, the epidemic size is reduced by 19% . Our results suggest a new implementation of a highly effective
strategy for targeted vaccinations through the use of popular locations in rural communities.
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1 Introduction
Influenza A (H1N1), commonly known as swine flu, continues to be the dominant influenza virus in circulation
across the globe with many countries and overseas territories reporting laboratory confirmed cases, including
at thousands of deaths [12]. Factually, the origin of pandemic virus strains, such as the current H1N1, often
trace back to rural regions. For example, the H1N1 2009 virus is suspected to have been originated in La
Gloria, a small town near Veracruz, Mexico. Also, the previous strain of H1N1, commonly known as the
Spanish Flu of 1918 that wrought devastation around the world, originated within the rural State of Kansas
near Fort Riley. Other instances of epidemics originating in rural regions include the swine flu that originated
in September 1988 at a hog barn in Walworth County, Wisconsin, the H5N3 virus that was identified at La
Garnache farm in France in late January 2009, and the Asian flu that was a category 2 avian influenza in
Ghizhou, China in 1956.
For analysis and containment purposes, large cities are generally considered to be infection hubs owing to the
large population densities and mobility indices. Consequently, most spatio-temporal research on infectious
human diseases focuses on large cities, such as Portland [13], Chicago [14], and Dresden [8], which respectively
represent excellent examples of an agent-based model, a multi-scale meta-population model, and a
social-structure model, defining different levels of detail and complexity. Another approach to characterize the
heterogeneous epidemic terrain of a human population is based on the construction of the network
representing contacts among people. Studies of this type include [1], [2], and [20].
Various immunization strategies have been formulated for urban populations. Some of these strategies
assumed that the human population distribution can be estimated as scale free. One such strategy was a
targeted immunization wherein nodes having the highest connectivity were deemed to be the most critical for
spreading the infection, and hence those highly connected people were chosen for vaccination [9]. However,
global immunization strategies require the knowledge of the entire network of individuals and are complex
from both computation and implementation stand points. Conversely, localized mitigation strategies, such as
acquaintance immunization [10], randomly choose a subset of the entire population, and randomly select a set
of their acquaintances to vaccinate. This strategies require a lower fraction of the population to be vaccinated
than a random global immunization to dampen the impact of an epidemic. Other localized immunization
methods include targeting acquaintances of randomly selected people by their estimated contact
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characteristics [11].
Disease dynamics in rural regions [6] [7] have received limited study. Since the population densities and human
mobility indices of rural regions are very different from those of cities, it is imperative to develop specific
mitigation schemes to impede the spread of epidemics right from its likely source, the rural location.
Furthermore, recent studies show that rural residents have a lower likelihood to obtain certain preventive
health services than urban residents [3]. These factors necessitate research on predictive and optimally
preventive strategies in rural regions.
This paper takes a unique look at rural regions, and presents mitigation strategies tailored for rural Clay
county in Kansas, USA. We propose mitigation strategies that are based on a contact network model
developed using data collected through a survey campaign conducted in rural Clay and Kearny counties in
Kansas, USA. By characterizing the contact structure of rural regions, we are able to investigate the influences
of this structure and various mitigation strategies on the speed, shape, and size of the outbreak. Our analysis
shows that, although global targeted strategies are the most efficient in mitigating epidemics with a limited
amount of resources, they can also be unfeasible due to partial knowledge of the population and conflicts with
individual rights. Random vaccine distribution in selected popular location within a rural community offers
the opportunity to indirectly reach the individuals who play a significant role in the epidemic propagation. We
demonstrate with simulations that this location-based strategy can be 55% as effective as the best global
target strategy.
2 Methods
Our simulation results on epidemic spreading in rural communities are based on data collected through
distributed surveys. This data is used to construct a contact network and to analyze the epidemic. Several
random and targeted mitigation strategies are investigated through an SEIR model with parameters estimated
in an analysis of the recent H1N1 influenza [14].
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2.1 Survey Data
In Spring 2009, we surveyed residents of two rural Kansas counties through a visit to a county seat and mailed
surveys, under our direct personal supervision. We obtained ethics approval in January 2009 for research
protocols, survey forms, and informed consent procedures used, by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of
Kansas State University, Human Subjects Committee, University research Compliance Office, 203 Fairchild
Hall, Manhattan, Kansas. All potential participants were provided informed consent in a cover letter attached
to their surveys; signatures were not required from the participants as a way of protecting their privacy.
The mailed surveys were well accepted with response rates of 64.8% and 41%, respectively for Clay County
and Kearny County. The survey consisted of 30 short questions, a question concerning visits to local
businesses and locations, a question concerning visits to cities within the surrounding region, and a set of
contact questions. The spread of an epidemic in rural areas may be influenced by both the vulnerability of the
population and the extent of their contacts with each other. Vulnerability includes their susceptibility to
infection due to both poor health and a lack of preventive measures, such as vaccination. Once an epidemic
has begun, the willingness of the population to comply with precautionary health measures can influence the
rate and extent to which the epidemic spreads. In the survey, all these factors were assessed.
Survey results yielded four measures of risk factors important to the spread of epidemics: health risk, contact
risk, prevention risk, and compliance risk. To what extent did these risks overlap? Each possible combination
of risks was evaluated and summarized in Table 1. It is interesting to note that people with the most contacts
tended to have the least preparedness for an epidemic, and people who were willing to visit others even during
an epidemic were among those most at-risk because of their health status. Additionally, those who tended to
visit friends and family members more often during normal times were also likely to retain this behavior even
under epidemic conditions. This property of the rural communities is interesting, since it provides a given level
of stability within the contact network and increases the accuracy of our epidemic analysis.
Survey results were also used to construct the weighted contact network. To this purpose, we used the survey
responses about frequently visited locations and the levels of contacts. The respondents were asked to identify
within a set of locations, those which they visit on a typical day. The responses were captured as a binary
vector Li for each respondent i with each element corresponding to a location. The contact questions asked the
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respondents to estimate the number of individuals with whom the respondent made contact for three different
levels of contact. Contact levels were classified into Proximity contact (coming within 5 feet of another person,
even if in passing), Direct-Low contact (directly touching another person for a short period of time in what
most people would consider a low risk situation of being infected), and Direct-High contact (directly touching
another person for an extended period of time or in what most people would consider a relatively high risk
situation of being infected). The responses of the contact questions are quantified as values nx,i that represent
the number of individuals contacted by respondent i in a typical day according to each contact level x.
2.2 Contact Network Construction
With these responses, the rural community is represented as a weighted contact network where each of the
survey respondents is represented as a node within the network that is connected together with links
representing the contact between respondents. Each link has a weight that represents the normalized measure
of contact between the connected pair of respondents or nodes. Each link’s weight wi,j is taken as the average
of three sub-weights that correspond to the interactions between node i and node j estimated for each contact
level x. Values of weights wi,j range within the interval [0, 1]. We capture the location responses within the
parameter µi,j = (1 + li,j)/(1 + d), where d is the total number of locations and li,j is the dot product of the
respective location vectors Li and Lj for nodes i and j. For a give type of contact x, the related sub-weight
function depends on the node degrees and the parameter µi,j . When either node degree nx,i or nx,j is zero,
the sub-weight should be equal to zero. The sub-weight should also increase monotonically with both nx,i and
nx,j , approaching unity when both are large. When a pair of nodes visit all the locations, µi,j is equal to unity
and the sub-weight should be maximum. On the other hand, µi,j has a small positive minimum, to allow for
interactions outside the locations included in the survey. For given nx,i and nx,j , the sub-weight should be
minimum when li,j is equal to zero, and should increase monotonically with increasing li,j , and consequently
µi,j .
For each contact level x, we compute the sub-weight wx,i,j between node i and node j according to a simple
function which follows the desired behavior:
wx,i,j = (1− (1− µi,jpix)nx,i)(1− (1− µi,jpix)nx,j ) (1)
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We selected the values of pix such that they include the relative importance of each of the three contact
categories from the survey responses, constraining piProximity to be less than piDirect−Low and piDirect−Low to
be less than piDirect−High. The values of pix have been estimated by matching the epidemic curve of the H1N1
outbreak in La Gloria, Mexico, with the average epidemic curve obtained with the weighted network
simulations for Clay Center. Based on the minimum squared error, we found that the best contact levels for
Proximity, Direct-High and Direct-Low contact are piProximity = 0.0025, piDirect−Low = 0.015, and
piDirect−High = 1.0. Figure 1 reports the number of new infected individuals in La Gloria [22] with the
corresponding simulated new infected individuals in Clay Center, Kansas given the best estimated values for
the three contact levels. This parameter estimation was done through an SEIR epidemic model, which we
describe in the following sections.
With the estimated model parameters, we have created the weighted contact network shown in Figure
2(a)-2(i). In Figure 2(a), only links with strength greater or equal to 0.2 are depicted. In the successive
subfigures more links are added by reducing the threshold, reaching the complete network in Figure 2(f),
where all links are depicted. Figure 2(i) is the union of two networks: the network obtained for threshold 0.1
and the network of the best friends where for each node only the link with highest strength is depicted. Figure
2(i) has been used to create Figure 3, where not only nodes representing people, but also nodes representing
popular locations in Clay Center are shown. We performed a sensitivity analysis on each pix, varying their
values up to 15%. These variations, shown in Table 2, produce a maximum of 3.4% variation in total infection
cases, with most changes resulting in a variation of less than 1% in total cases.
To compare our selection of the structure of the weight wx,i,j shown in Eq. 1, we have constructed another
weighted contact network based only on data about common visited locations. In this case, the weights w1i,j
are computed as w1i,j = (li,j)/(d). The network constructed in this way has 38% of nodes isolated, i.e., with
node degree equal to zero, and when we simulated the SEIR model only 63% of the infected nodes coincided
with the infected nodes obtained using the same model on our contact network. Consequently, the use of only
location data produces not negligeable differences in the results and is not considered in the following analysis.
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2.3 Network Metrics
To describe in details the characteristics of the weighted contact network, we select some graph-theoretical
metrics that reflect the local and global properties of the graph [21]. In Table 3, some relevant metrics for the
contact networks are listed. The contact network is composed of 138 nodes (N) and 9222 links. It is
important to note that that the network is not far from a fully connected network, which would have 9453
links. However, each link can have a very different importance due to the structure of the link weights. For
this reason, we select the node strength as one metric to characterize a node. The strength si of node i is
defined as the sum of the weights wi,j of all links between node i and its neighbors si =
∑
j∈neighbors(i) wi,j .
The node strength is analogous to the node degree in the binary network, which measures the number of
contacts or neighbors of a node. The second metric we compute is the average shortest path. To compute
shortest path properly, we define the distance di,j between any neighbor nodes i and j as di,j = 1− wi,j . The
distance defined in this way is always non-negative and reveals a short distance separating node i and node j
when their link weight wi,j is high. The third metric, the network diameter is defined as the longest of the
shortest paths. As a centrality measure, we compute the betweenness bi of a node i. It is defined as the
measure of the number of shortest paths between any pair of nodes passing through node i.
bi =
∑
h,j
σh,j,i
σh,j
(2)
where σh,j is the total number of shortest paths from node h to j and σh,j,i is the number of those shortest
paths that pass through the node i. A node that appears in many shortest paths has high betweenness. Each
bi is normalized by the maximum number of shortest paths that can pass through a node (N − 1) ∗ (N − 2)/2.
Another measure of node centrality is the clustering coefficient of a node i ci, which measures the level of
connection among the neighbors of node i.
ci =
1
ki(ki− 1)
∑
j,k
[wˆi,jwˆi,kwˆj,k]
1
3 (3)
where wˆi,j = wi,j/max(wi,j) and ki is the degree of node i in the binary version of the weighted contact
network [17]. By averaging over all individual clustering coefficients, we obtain the average clustering
coefficient of the contact network. The node coreness is the maximum value k such that the node still exists in
the network, before being removed in the k + 1 core. The k-core of a graph is a maximal subgraph in which
each vertex has at least strength k. The coreness measures the deepness of a node in the core of the network
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where a higher value indicates that the node is deeper in the core. The discrete values for the strength classes
are obtained by a fine quantization of the node strength (step size on the order of 10−6). From the spectral
domain, the maximum eigenvalue is the largest eigenvalue of the weighted adjacency matrix W representing
the network. The elements of W are the weights wi,j , and the matrix in this case is symmetric and has zeros
in the main diagonal. A large maximum eigenvalue corresponds to a small epidemic threshold in the
Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible model [16].
Networks often display some level of grouping of nodes in an organized fashion that allow them to be divided
into different clusters or communities. One popular method of detecting communities is to maximize a
parameter known as modularity [18]. Modularity is a measure of the difference between the edges within each
community and the expected number of edges in the same community, summed over all communities within
the graph. Using the weighted version of the algorithm described in [19], we found two communities within
our contact network. With a modularity value of 0.1087, 61% of the population fell into community 1 and the
remaining 39% of the population composed community 2.
2.4 SEIR Model on the Contact Network
We expand the weighted compartmental model [16] to represent the different disease states of individuals:
Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, and Recovered. The states and the transitions between states are unique to
each disease and its characteristics, requiring customization to each disease. In this model, we selected
β = 0.4, where β is the rate of infection across a link between a susceptible individual and infected individual,
 ≈ 0.909, where  is the transition rate parameter between the Exposed and Infected compartments, and
δ = 0.4, where δ is the transition rate parameter between the Infected and Recovered compartments [15]. The
network topology plays an important role in the spreading process in the transition from S to E when an I
individual contacts an S individual and successfully infects him/her. The probability that node i is not
infected at time t depends on the probabilities that a neighbor node j is previously infected (pj,t−1), is in
contact with node i (wi,j), and successfully infects node i (β) [16].
ζi,t =
∏
j∈contacts
(1− wi,jβPj,t−1) (4)
The probability that a node is infected (transition from S to E) at time t is then 1− ζi,t. The remaining
transitions are topology independent and only depend on the rate parameters,  and δ, of the disease model.
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When an individual has contracted the disease and transitioned into the exposed or latent compartment, the
individual transitions to the next state (I) with rate . Once Infected, a node attempts to infect it’s
susceptible neighbors until it transitions to the recovered state. Each Infected node recovers with recovery rate
δ. Once a node is recovered (R), it remains recovered for the remainder of the simulation. The recovered
compartment serves as an accumulator of all the cases, thus the number of recovered individuals |R| at the
end of a simulation is a decent approximation of the total number of cases caused by the outbreak. The blue
curve in Figure 1 has been computed using the above model.
2.5 Epidemic Simulations
The analysis of the epidemic evolution and the evaluation of multiple mitigation strategies is performed using
an SEIR model on the contact network. We propose different immunization strategies that can be
implemented as vaccinations or antiviral treatments. The immunization strategies are classified in three
categories based on individuals, locations, and communities. In each individual immunization strategy, nodes
are chosen either deliberately, based on a node metric or randomly.
The random selection of nodes as recipients of an immunization represents an unbiased distribution of
resources and is the simplest method for distribution. The node metrics selected for the targeting strategies
include node strength, node coreness, and node betweenness. Node strength, as a measure of how well an
individual is connected with the rural population, is an intuitive measure of how likely a node is to be infected
by other nodes as well as how likely the node is to pass the infection on to others. Therefore to mitigate the
infection while using node strength to select nodes, we target the nodes with the highest strength. The node
coreness is a measure of how deep a node is in the core of a network. This depth is a measure of the maximum
strength of the nodes iteratively removed from the network periphery before the node is removed. From a
topological perspective, the core of the network facilitates connectivity and is vital for it. Therefore a targeted
removal or immunization of the core nodes serves to hinder and disrupt the connectivity that allow the spread
of the infection. The betweenness of a node measures how many shortest paths between all pairs of nodes
choose to route through the node. Thus targeting nodes with highest betweenness serves to disrupt the
shortest paths that the virus can take, forcing it to longer routes. We applied these different targeting
strategies globally on the entire network and then within the communities and selected locations. The
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immunization of a node is implemented by forcing the immunized nodes to remain Susceptible throughout the
epidemic.
In Table 4 the reduction in the number of cases by percentage with respect to the unmitigated epidemic is
shown, for different criteria for the selection of the 10% of immunized people among the global population.
The most effective strategy is the one where the 10% of nodes with highest strength are selected, in line with
previous results, followed by the one based on the selection of 10% of the nodes with the deepest coreness.
However, these types of strategies have an inherent problem: how can we practically detect those special
nodes? Fortunately, the data collected on the location popularity, can help to solve this problem. The survey
respondents associated themselves with various locations in the county by indicating which ones they typically
visit. We used two criteria to select the locations for targeting and random strategies. To select locations for
the random strategies, we chose the locations having the highest average value of the desired metric and being
associated with at least 10% of the population. For the targeting strategies, we chose the locations visited by
more than 10% of the population, and we immunized 10% of the population by selecting nodes with the
highest combined sum for the desired metric within those locations. In Table 5, the reduction in the number of
cases by percentage is shown, when the immunization of the selected people is performed among the group
visiting a particular location.
3 Results and Discussion
Obtained results span the two investigated areas, namely risk assessment and mitigation strategy evaluations.
Concerning risk assessment, very few rural respondents (2%) did not have a high level of risk in at least one of
four areas assessed: health risk, contact risk, prevention risk, and compliance risk. Over 75% of households did
not have complete uptake of flu vaccine, nearly half of respondents had at least one major health risk, and
nearly two-fifths of respondents said they would not comply with directives to stay at home during an
epidemic. Risk levels were positively associated, suggesting that risks were compounded with each other, a
situation posing greater problems for any attempt to predict or reduce the spread of epidemics in rural areas.
Married respondents were much less likely to report selected health risks by a substantial margin (38% vs.
69%). Other demographics factors had relatively small associations with health, compliance, prevention, or
contact risks, although some nonlinear associations between income and the risk factors were noted, with
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middle-income respondents having the lowest risk levels compared to lower or higher-income respondents.
Concerning mitigation strategies evaluation, Table 4 shows that the random immunization of 10% of the
population (first strategy) reduces the epidemic size by 11.40%, with no substantial gain. However, if 10% of
the nodes with highest node strength are immunized (second strategy), the epidemic size is reduced by
34.57%, more than three times the size of the random immunization campaign. In the interesting case where
the 10% of the immunized nodes are randomly selected within the group of people frequently visiting a specific
popular location (third strategy), an intermediate benefit, of about 19% epidemic size reduction, is obtained.
The identification of specific locations visited by highest strength nodes has the clear benefit of improving the
efficiency of a random immunization campaign, when this campaign is conducted in specific locations. Figure
4 shows the curves of new infected nodes with time under free evolution and for the discussed three mitigation
strategies.
Our simulations suggest that information and immunization activities for rural communities should be carried
out in specific locations, called key locations, which not only most people but also the most key people
(highest strength nodes) often visit. Detecting key locations requires some amount of data collection and
analysis. However, detecting key locations is much easier than identifying highest strength nodes. In other
words, the probability of immunizing a highest strength node given a node random selection in a key location
is much higher that the probability of immunizing a highest strength node given a node random selection in
the entire population.
In the presence of limited anti-viral and vaccination resources, government health agencies should seek to use
the most effective methods of distribution for mitigation of the threat. Here we have investigated the
distribution of immunizations to 10 percent of the population through various targeting strategies. This work
is of particular interest to rural regions as they are more likely to face resource shortages due to smaller
budgets than urban areas. Due to lower population densities, rural regions are more likely to have a small set
of local businesses and locations that are therefore easier to classify and target for distribution. This work has
shown the benefit of being able to select proper distribution locations, a strategy that can be implemented
without having full knowledge of every individual within the rural population.
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Table 1: Interrelationships of risk measures
Health-Contact Health-Prevention Health-Compliance
As contact risk rose from low to Of those respondents from families in The percentage of respondents
medium to high, the percentage of which all members had been with one or more at-risk health
respondents with one or more vaccinated, only 34.1% had one or conditions tended to rise as a
at-risk health conditions rose more at-risk health conditions, function of their unwillingness
linearly from 37.7% to 45.0% to compared to 49.6% of those from to comply with a directive
56.3% (p < 0.18 by chi-square families in which at least some of the to stay at home during an
test; r= 0.15, p < 0.07) members had not been vaccinated epidemic : no visits (46.1%),
(p < 0.09). one or two (38.8%), and three
or more(75.0%)(p < 0.08).
Those who would be most Those who were most susceptible to Those who were willing to visit
vulnerable or susceptible to an an epidemic were least likely to be others even during an epidemic
epidemic were actually most prepared for it in terms of anticipatory were among those most at-risk
likely to be engaging in multiple vaccination. because of their health status.
contacts with friends, family,
and guests.
Contact-Prevention Contact-Compliance Prevention-Compliance
As contact levels rose from low to As contact levels rose from low to Those from families that were
medium to high, the percentage of medium to high, the percentage of fully vaccinated declined
households with full vaccinations respondents who would not comply from 29.1% to 22.0% to 0.0% as
fell from 32.1% to 19.7% with health directives to remain at respondents shifted away from
and 20.8%, respectively (p < 0.25 home rose from 29.4% to 40.0% to no visits, one or two visits,
by chi-square test; r = 0.11, 44.7%, respectively (p < 0.28 by or three or more visits during an
p < 0.18). chi-square test; r = 0.13, p < 0.12). epidemic (p < 0.08 by chi-square
test; r = 0.17, p < 0.04).
Those with the most contacts Those who tended to visit friends and Those making the most visits
tended to have the least family members more often during were the least likely to be
preparedness for an epidemic. normal times were also likely to protected by vaccination.
retain this behavior even under
epidemic conditions.
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis showing percentage differences from original number of total cases
Percentage Difference -15% -10% -5% +5% +10% +15%
piProximity -0.29334 -0.22053 -0.10083 -0.00539 0.15957 0.22018
piDirect−Low -0.70028 -0.49687 -0.26954 0.20365 0.50449 0.77051
piDirect−High -3.44748 -2.02815 -0.95024 X X X
Table 3: Network Metrics for Contact Network
Network Metric Value Network Metric Value
Links 9222 Aver. Link Weight 0.006454
Diameter in no. of Hops 2 Aver. Node Coreness 0.49579034
Aver. Clustering Coefficient 0.0037 Aver. Node Betweenness 0.000179682
Aver. Node Strength 0.8626 Aver. Shortest Path By Distance 1.01699
Diameter by Distance 1.99996 Max Eigenvalue of Weighted Matrix 480.5959
14
Table 4: Global Mitigation Strategies
Mitigation Strategy 10% Immunization % Reduction of Total Cases Cases Prevented per Vaccine
Random 11.40 0.69
Highest Strength Nodes 34.57 2.11
Highest Coreness Nodes 25.18 1.53
Highest Betweenness Nodes 16.27 0.99
Table 5: Location-based Mitigation Strategies
Mitigation Strategy 10% Immunization % Reduction of Total Cases Cases Prevented per Vaccine
Random in Most Popular Location 14.25 0.87
Random in Highest Strength Location 18.97 1.16
Highest Strength in Most Popular Location 34.57 2.11
Highest Coreness in Most Popular Location 25.17 1.53
Highest Coreness in Highest Coreness Location 24.31 1.48
Figure 1: Number of new infected individuals in La Gloria, Mexico by day, [22] with the corresponding new
infected individuals in Clay Center, Kansas, given the best estimated values for the three contact levels, averaged
over 10,000 simulations.
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(a) link threshold 0.2 (b) link threshold 0.1 (c) link threshold 0.05
(d) link threshold 0.0125 (e) link threshold 0.003125 (f) complete network
(g) link threshold 0.1 (h) best friend network (i) union of 2(g) and 2(h)
Figure 2: The rural contact network is composed by nodes representing individuals and weighted edges repre-
senting contacts, displaying all edges with weights greater than the following thresholds: a) 0.20, b) 0.10, c)
0.05, d) 0.0125, e) 0.003125, and f) 0. In the last row, g) shows the edges with weights greater than 0.10, h)
shows the highest weighted edge for each node, and i) shows the union of the previous two networks.
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Figure 3: The network of people and popular locations in Clay Center, Kansas, where the nodes (survey
respondents) in the cloud network are connected via green edges to the locations in Clay Center according to
the survey responses. The map is courtesy of Google.
Figure 4: Newly infected nodes by day as a percentage of the population without and with mitigations strategies,
including random vaccination throughout the population, random vaccination among nodes associated with a
selected location, and targeted vaccination of a set of nodes having the highest node strength within the rural
contact network.
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